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The challenges of immigration and its management are global. It is estimated that migrants that 
traversed international boundaries 
more than doubled between 1980 
and 2010. They increased from 103 
million to 220 million. In 2013, the 
number of international migrants 
was put at 232 million and projected 
to double to over 400 million by 
2050.1 Philip Martin, a professor of 
the Comparative Immigration and 
Integration Programme, also notes that 
about 60 percent of global migrants 
are in the 30 or more industrialised 
countries. Some 40 percent of migrants 
are in the 170 poorer developing 
countries. Almost half of the world’s 
migrants are women, 15 percent 
of migrants are under 20, and less 
than 7 percent of all international 
migrants are refugees. In the new 
millennium, immigration has acquired 
greater import and has become more 
complex the world over. Immigration 
has historically confronted the idea of 
territoriality, the behaviour of animals 
or people that try to keep others away 
from an area that they assert to be 
theirs or seize control of. Territoriality 
may also be directly associated with 
attempts by various animals and 
groups to protect the integrity of 
their communities in the long term. 
Accordingly mass movements, even if 
they are undertaken as individuals or 
in small groups at a time, have been 
problematic since the beginning of 
human movements. 
The human attitude of instinctive 
perception of threats posed by 
increased human movements, 
interpreted as invasion, encroachment 
or breaches of territoriality from the 
outside, has lagged behind historic 
advances in concepts in global modes 
of social organisations, political and 
economic. At the same time, it is clear 
that profound transformation in the 
sensibilities of international society has 
impacted on the new definition and 
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anticipated responses to this historic 
conundrum. It may be posited that the 
transformed or evolving international 
sensibilities have impacted on the 
expectations of how immigrants are 
treated. These emerging new impulses 
are however at variance with the 
overall postures of state policy that are 
still founded on realist principles in a 
significantly or struggling post-realist 
international environment. For realists, 
the most important national interest is 
the survival of the state, including its 
people, political system, and territorial 
integrity. Realists contend that, as long 
as the world is divided into nation-states 
in an anarchic setting, national interest 
will remain the essence of international 
politics. Accordingly, realists perceive 
danger posed by mass immigration 
to the integrity of national interests, 
including the dominant culture. 
Post-realists focus less on power and 
depreciate the centrality of power in 
relations between states. In fact they 
challenge the legitimacy of force in the 
interaction among states. They are less 
resistant to immigration. This different 
orientation has led to sharp discourses 
internal to states and among states on 
the global immigration crisis. 
The interplay of domestic 
political factors and forces impinge 
on the policy responses to the 
challenge of immigration. This is an 
acute consideration in the African 
environment, where a pervasive sense 
of the unlimited solidarity of the earthly 
wretched across international frontiers 
in Africa is deeply and conveniently 
ingrained in society. Borders exist 
only in reality, but not in any mental 
recognition of their existence. They 
are therefore meant to be breached in 
Africa. It is much more so in relation 
to continental perceptions of a sense of 
entitlement to an open black ruled post-
Apartheid South Africa given its special 
place in the tortuous story of African 
emancipation, its sterling economy and 
the universality of its ideological motor 
that drove its liberation struggle. 
These expectations are not 
mediated by a keener appreciation of 
the excruciating internal configurations 
that persist merely two decades into 
black majority rule. These include 
certain persisting mind-sets that 
were validated by the liberation 
struggle but necessarily requiring 
due de-legitimation in building a 
new South Africa. One example is 
the entrenchment of revolutionary 
violence, and a second is a problematic 
conceptual dichotomy of South 
Africa from the rest of the continent 
that needs to be transcended as a 
fundamental prerequisite to transit 
South Africa from its apartheid era 
attitude and to integrate it mentally 
and in actuality into the mainstream of 
African existential realities. 
More importantly on the continental 
aisle is the undeniable lack of political 
will in many African states to stem 
emigration through an un-abating 
creation and export of mass produced 
poor and wearied who are primed 
to go in search of greener pastures 
further abroad or in the  immediate 
abroad. Horrendous governance 
paradigms persist that continue to 
lead to defection of a disenchanted 
middle class to the down and out 
constituencies of the wretched across 
the continent. Current challenges of 
human haemorrhage and undesirable 
cargo from Africa to the world and in 
particular to South Africa constitute an 
egregious abuse of African and global 
solidarity. The state is at the heart of 
this global crisis.
The grounding of the nation state 
as a defining autonomous sociological 
enclave, sovereign political space 
and basic economic unit is a major 
culprit in the contemporaneous 
problematique of immigration and 
migrants. The nation-state’s clear 
demarcation of territory under its 
sole control and the entrenchment 
of the concept of nationhood that 
defines identities in nationality 
and statehoods as the normative 
institution regulating large scale human 
communities have ossified the human 
proclivity to contain movements 
of those considered outsiders. The 
management of challenges ensuing 
from the ascendance of the nation state 
in relation to basic human freedom 
of movement have very often been 
associated with tragic consequences 
as the world currently witnesses in the 
carnage of African and Asian migrants 
at sea in the West Mediterranean 
straits off the coast of Libya to Italy; 
or again in the plight of the over eight 
thousand Rohingya and Bangladeshi 
migrants, ‘Myanmar's unwanted 
people’, stranded at sea off the coast of 
Thailand for weeks unending. 
In this connection, Malaysian 
officials noted that 1,018 Bangladeshi 
and Rohingya refugees had landed 
illegally on one of the Langkawi 
islands. They apparently had been 
abandoned by people smugglers who 
were transporting them to Thailand. 
Meanwhile, dozens have been buried 
in unmarked graves. This scenario 
unfolds elsewhere, almost everywhere. 
Responses in recipient societies 
have been similarly antagonistic, 
even if they are nuanced in some 
and less so in others. The familiar 
international hypocritical postures 
have been at play to advance political 
objectives. In the United States, harsh 
society engagements and draconian 
measures by non-governmental 
militias against migrants from South 
of the border are carefully packaged 
to assuage international sensibilities, 
while in others, such as South Africa, 
international perceptions of challenges 
of managing immigration are couched 
in terms of xenophobia. Messaging has 
thus been a key factor in international 
reaction to these responses.
In Europe, there are separate rules 
for migrants emanating from Europe 
and others. Huge numbers of European 
Union citizens freely move from one 
EU country to another. Even though 
they are categorised as ‘migrants’, they 
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are fully protected by EU law, unless 
they are fugitive criminals. Their status 
is quite different from that of non-EU 
migrants. For migrants from other 
places, in particular Asia, Middle East 
and Africa, the Dublin system applies. 
This system is designed to obfuscate the 
real intention of keeping undesirables 
out. In conjunction with the revised 
Dublin Regulation, three other legal 
instruments constitute the ‘Dublin 
System’: These are Regulation (EU) No. 
603/2013 establishing the ‘Eurodac’ 
for the comparison of fingerprints for 
the effective application of the recast 
Dublin Regulation and Regulation 
(EU) No. 118/2014 which amends 
Regulation (EC) No. 1560/2003 laying 
down detailed rules for the application 
of the recast Dublin Regulation. The 
operation of the Dublin Regulation 
often acts to the detriment of refugees 
by causing serious delays in the 
examination of asylum claims. This 
can result in the asylum seekers’ 
claims never being heard. The system 
is characterised by the excessive use 
of detention to enforce transfers of 
asylum seekers, the division of families, 
the denial of an effective opportunity to 
appeal against transfers and the limited 
use of the discretionary provisions 
within the Regulation to alleviate these 
and other problems. Finally, it impedes 
integration of refugees by forcing them 
to have their claims determined in 
Member States with which they may 
have no particular connection.2 It is the 
concept of fortress Europe in practice.
Territoriality has thus remained a 
serious anachronistic impediment to 
contemporaneous social advancements 
that are represented by globalisation, 
including free movements of finance 
and labour, and more profoundly the 
evolution of the Westphalian statehood 
to the emergence of the post-modern, 
post statist and post material era. In 
Africa, these have been manifest in 
the challenge of sustaining African 
solidarity in a system still denominated 
on the outmoded planks and ethical 
gaps of a post-colonial statism of the 
African state. As the major economic 
destination with the largest aggregation 
of centripetal economic factors, South 
Africa has had to bear the brunt of a 
global phenomenon with the strength 
of a tsunami that is dividing Europe and 
has riven apart consensus on the way 
forward. 
The problems of human territoriality, 
a global phenomenon, and control of 
movements have been characterised 
by paradoxes. In the evolution of the 
United States, a nation of immigrants 
that nearly decimated the original 
inhabitants of the continent and 
defeated other claimants to territory 
in its West and South, the surge of 
immigrants to the country in the 
1920s led to the development of large, 
thriving communities of immigrants 
and minorities. This wave generated a 
considerable backlash among so called 
native-born Americans who feared they 
were losing their cities to ‘undesirable’ 
newcomers. Before the coming of the 
immigrants, a large majority of the 
American population – more than 60% 
– could trace their ancestry back to 
either the British Isles or to Germany. 
These old-line Americans, mostly 
fair-skinned and Protestant, the new 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP) 
of the vast and rich territory, tended to 
view the darker-complexioned, mostly 
Catholic or Jewish New Immigrants 
from Southern Europe as not just 
different but ‘inferior’ — members of 
lesser races, likely lacking the Anglo-
Saxon temperament many believed 
necessary to maintain a free society.3 
In Australia, a colony of migrants, 
a federated Australia was created 
to develop a common immigration 
policy that reflected the resistance 
to Chinese immigration. A White 
Australia policy was articulated to 
exclude all non-European people from 
immigrating into Australia, and was 
the official policy of all governments 
and all mainstream political parties in 
Australia from the 1890s to the 1950s. 
Elements of the policy survived until 
the 1970s. Although the expression 
'White Australia policy' was never in 
official use, it was common in political 
and public debate throughout the 
period. In South Africa, the Boers, also 
known as Afrikaners, descendants of 
the original Dutch settlers of southern 
Africa, declared a Republic of South 
Africa that excluded the original 
inhabitants of the region through its 
Apartheid policy. 
Some scholars believe apartheid 
was a product of racial prejudices and 
policies imposed by Dutch and British 
settlers. Recent scholarship highlights 
a combination of several factors that 
paved the way to apartheid, including 
colonial conquest, dispossession 
of the inhabitants, deliberate 
economic impoverishment and 
racial discrimination and segregation. 
What emerges from history is that 
territoriality associated with statehood 
and nationality remained a bane of the 
ideas of freedom of movement, to such 
an extent that today a debilitating global 
crisis of immigration has emerged from 
the United States, through Europe, 
Australia and in South Africa. This article 
examines the challenge of South Africa 
in managing immigration against the 
background of its continued dedication 
to African solidarity as a critical plank 
of the African Renaissance project in a 
Post Mandela World Order; and it puts 
this into global and historical contexts, 
as well as locating the challenges in the 
domestic socio-political and economic 
ferment. 
In the post-modernist dispensation 
and an increasingly globalised world 
with transformed humanist sensibilities 
of international society as distinct 
from an international community 
of formal states, immigration has 
broken down its long confinement to 
specialist discourses of demography, 
jurisprudence and public policy 
analysis and its increasing relation to 
macro processes of social change and 
the transformation of nation states 
as highlighted by many distinguished 
scholars of immigration, especially in 
the context of globalisation.4 Araoye5 
observes that post-modern states have 
developed transnational networks 
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of causes, based on shared values 
that bind civil society across state 
boundaries and enhance interests in 
international rules regulating these 
causes. This drives a new transnational 
political process that assures the 
acceptance by the states of the new 
principles which undermine old 
notions of sovereignty associated with 
the modern state. The states accept 
that international law has emerged as a 
regular feature of modern political life. 
Also, the post-modern order is built 
upon a new type of nation state which 
‘pools’ together its sovereignty with 
other states and accepts transnational 
and supranational legal authority above 
its own national law.6
Accordingly, post-modern states 
have repudiated the realist principles 
that guide interaction among modern 
states and no longer place emphasis 
on the use of force as a medium of 
transactions between them. They are 
thus in a post-realist era. While some 
of the main challenges of immigration 
elicited by the large scale movement of 
labour internationally across national 
boundaries, including a potential loss 
of sovereignty over entry and exit of 
national borders, seem to have been 
accentuated by recent developments, 
immigration has become a complex 
and multifaceted phenomenon 
spanning the ideological, economic 
and developmental, humanitarian 
and sociological, and even acquired a 
moral tone. The emerged complexity 
of mass movement of people across 
borders globally has rendered policy 
formulation very demanding and 
contentious as states and whole 
continents seek to grapple with the 
emerged multi-dimensional challenges 
posed by this international crisis. 
The post-modernists, often referred 
to as transnationalists, have faced 
a stiff rebuttal from conservative 
citizens on immigration who have 
derided them as trendy philosophical 
internationalists who are advocating 
the juggling of conflicting national 
and cultural allegiances, and call for 
the attenuation of specific national 
loyalties. The post-modernists on 
immigration are dismissed as mostly 
privileged academicians insulated from 
the realities of the world by tenure, 
who strenuously oppose the right to 
select and emphasise one aspect of 
the multiple cultural and national 
identities human beings possess. They 
are seen as constituting an intellectual 
advocate for the breakdown of law, for 
the repudiation of historical notions 
of what makes nation states and civil 
society, undermining civic traditions, 
professing the violation of the sanctity 
of borders that once commanded 
unquestioned assent, and using a term 
like patriotism only jokingly.7  
The reality however is that some 
neo-liberals accept the beneficial 
impact of an open immigration 
regime. In the United Kingdom, a 
neo-liberal commentator was clear 
that high levels of immigration are part 
and parcel of neoliberalism, because 
they offer speedy, few-questions-
asked economic growth. For some 
reason, however, both Labour and the 
Conservatives have shied away from 
explaining to ‘ordinary people’ that 
immigrants provide a steady supply of 
labour, stopping ‘ordinary’ wages and 
expectations from getting out of hand.8 
For those on the left, international 
solidarity imposes the imperative of 
joining forces to liberate workers, 
irrespective of nationality, race or 
gender. The division is thus strictly 
not only ideological but is manifested 
in differing attitudes and orientations 
that have impacted on immigration 
policy in Europe, the USA, Asia, Latin 
America and Australia. 
Meanwhile, all over the world, from 
the USA, through Ukraine, Austria, 
France, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and China immigrants have been made 
scapegoats. The differences are in the 
approaches and who is leading the 
charge against foreigners. In the United 
States and Europe, where the state 
leads the charge against foreigners, the 
assaults are very nuanced and couched 
in a language that confers legitimacy. 
Historically, discriminatory immigration 
policies aimed at southern and eastern 
Europeans were prominent in the 
quota-based policies of the 1920s. 
Through the Immigration Act of 1924, 
also known as the National Origins Act 
or Johnson-Reed Act, the U.S. used 
restrictive immigration policies in the 
1920s based on the 1890 proportions 
of foreign-born European nationalities. 
It was also held that immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe were 
unskilled, ignorant, predominantly 
Catholic or Jewish and not easily 
assimilated into American culture.9 
A century and half later, to protect 
the threatened hegemony of the 
WASP dominant USA, or in Australia, 
the more sophisticated institutional 
violence that was unleashed was 
taken off the streets and rationalised 
in carefully couched euphemisms in 
carefully arranged and managed bogus 
discourse. Violence against foreigners 
can be very crude when the militias, 
both from the mainstream as in the 
USA and Australia, or the margins as 
in South Africa take it upon themselves 
to help the government to solve 
perceived threats of foreign invasion. 
This real xenophobia is a recurrent 
phenomenon or a crisis that belies 
globalisation.
The United States shares a common 
border of about 2,000 miles (3,200 
kms) with Mexico and has a large Latino 
community. This is the largest minority 
and fastest growing community in 
the United States. The US Customs 
and Border Protection spent $2.4 
billion between 2006 and 2009 to 
complete 670 miles of border fence 
that is designed to keep foreigners 
or their vehicles from crossing into 
the United States, according to a 
Government Accountability Office 
report. When completed the cost of 
this state-of-the-art border fence has 
been estimated at between four and 
eight billion dollars.  A poll conducted 
by a conservative news outlet suggests 
that the American people favoured a 
proposal to construct this 2,000 mile 
security fence by a 51-to-37 percent 
margin. 
Meanwhile, the total illegal alien 
population was estimated by Secretary 
of Homeland Security at 8 to 12 million 
in December 2003, even though to 
heighten perception of the threat posed 
to the American way of life, some major 
news outlets regularly use 20 million 
as a more realistic number of illegal 
aliens in the US. The conservatives 
who are the main backers of fencing 
off the Mexican border claim that a 
sea of illegal aliens provides a cover 
and an environment in which terrorists 
can hide, and the tide of in-coming 
aliens provides terrorists with a reliable 
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means of entry. They also allege that 
foreigners are drug couriers. Such 
is the fear of Latino immigrants that 
private minutemen and anti-immigrant 
militias have been established in states 
like Texas and Arizona ‘to do the job 
their government refuses to do’ and 
‘protect America’ from tens of millions 
plundering ‘our’ nation. They argue 
that ‘it should be legal to kill illegals.’ 
In Australia, the government 
dumps desperate immigrants who 
have survived perilous sea journeys 
to escape poverty and discrimination 
in facilities totally inappropriate and 
ill-equipped, with people cramped 
into leaking tents, suffering from 
physical and mental ailments, creating 
a climate of anguish, especially during 
the repressively hot monsoon season. 
Australia is also known to have refused 
to rescue boat people caught in storms 
who died when their boats capsized. 
The waiting time to be processed in this 
uninhabitable hell located in Nauru is 
five years under the Government’s 
horrendous ‘no advantage’ policy. 
Offshore processing of the so-called 
illegals on Nauru and Manus Island is 
designed to break vulnerable people in 
these ill-conceived limbo camps. 
China’s very stringent monitoring 
of foreigners is legendary as many 
Africans are forced into debt and 
imprisoned for merely overstaying 
their visa. There have been deadly 
riots. Also the perennial conflagration 
in the outskirts and ghettoes of 
French cities need no recall. The 
French government is known to have 
offered monetary incentives to get 
rid of unwanted foreigners, including 
‘gypsies’ or Romans, who were once 
forcibly ejected from the country.   
In Africa, South Africa has been 
singularly hit by this world-wide 
phenomenon. This was inevitably 
a near and popular destination for 
the poor and wearied of Africa and 
Asia. Barely two decades into its 
majority rule, in the context of its 
internal challenges and the struggle 
as with most states hit by this global 
challenge, South Africa has paid the 
price of sluggish messaging and faced 
the familiar hypocrisy of a world that 
has traditionally designed one measure 
for Africa and another for itself.  But it 
is Africa that has been caught in the 
beams of the hypocritical international 
searchlight. 
The challenge of immigration into 
South Africa opens an opportunity 
to examine our own assumptions in 
relation to principles and expectations 
that underpin intra-African relations, 
develop common understandings and 
map out strategies for the management 
of relationships. Whatever 
compulsions, instinctive, emotional or 
plain and hard-nosed rational, drive 
our responses to recent developments 
in the country, sight cannot be lost of 
the ready label of xenophobia that was 
stuck on the ugly outbreak of violence 
visited upon non-South African 
migrants. Yet, the pertinent question 
is, “Was this really xenophobia?”  The 
issue is framed by columnist Mathatha 
Tsedu, who put it in the Johannesburg 
City Press as “Why are we failing as 
Africans?” 
Meanwhile, the campaign and 
activism against xenophobia of 
African artists resident in South Africa 
seems to be a simplistic framing of 
the international crisis that does not 
get to the real heart of the challenge. 
The xenophobic type attacks are 
symptomatic of larger festering 
challenges that South Africa has been 
unable to resolve in twenty-one years 
of post-Apartheid black rule. South 
Africa has been unable to wean itself 
from some of the most devastating 
legacies of Apartheid. This includes 
the de-legitimising of a dangerous 
mind-set that was needed to validate 
the revolutionary violence that was 
unleashed to overcome Apartheid. 
The structures of the economy remain 
skewed and South African society 
increasingly differentiated between an 
emerged small black elite and a mass 
black impoverished. These failures 
have all impacted on the character of 
post-Apartheid South African society 
with serious consequences. 
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Main street South Africa deals with 
the horror of unimaginable violence 
practically on a daily basis. But this 
happens behind the fortified walls of 
highly secured gated communities. 
Once in a while, this sanguine reality 
is expressed along the margins of 
mainstream of South Africa in the 
scapegoating of fellow Africans. The 
pattern of violence suggests a systemic 
trauma that impacts on both foreigners 
and South Africans alike. Even the 
men’s hostel, a hold-over idea from 
the Apartheid era, has not yet been 
dismantled. Violence witnessed in the 
past few months seems to manifest a 
crisis that has engulfed this embattled 
rainbow nation. All residents of the 
country, across the social strata, are 
caught in the throes of violence. 
Only a very brutal re-evaluation of 
flailing social and developmental 
paradigms employed by the South 
African government can begin to instil 
a semblance of normalcy in relations 
among South Africans, between South 
Africans and the continent. These harsh 
measures to be adopted are the default 
approaches that have been adopted 
in many other African countries. It 
would require the understanding of 
other Africans to give South Africa a 
chance to recalibrate its economic and 
social blueprint to meet the legitimate 
aspirations of those in the margins 
who perceive themselves as being left 
behind, as South Africa moves into its 
third decade of majority rule. 
The South African situation deviates 
in many respects from these cases. 
South Africans often assume that since 
the end of apartheid and the coming 
of democracy in 1994, there has been 
a huge wave of migration into their 
country from the rest of the continent. 
But in reality, the figures remain 
unclear. The country's Human Sciences 
Research Council once estimated that 
there are 4 to 8 million undocumented 
migrants in South Africa, but  Statistics 
South Africa, a government agency, 
estimates undocumented persons in the 
country to be somewhere in the range 
of 500,000 to 1 million. Meanwhile, 
the University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg assesses that the overall 
foreign population in South Africa 
ranges from 1.6 to 2 million, or 3 to 4 
percent of the total population. They 
also report that there are between 
1 and 1.5 million legal and illegal 
Zimbabwean immigrants in South 
Africa. This is in the context of national 
unemployment that has long been a 
major preoccupation for the South 
African Government. Despite its high 
unemployment rate, South Africa has 
the highest number of immigrants in 
the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).10 
Whatever the volume of the 
problem of illegal migrants in South 
Africa, the problem is that official 
South Africa is caught on the horns of a 
dilemma. It must resolve the challenge 
of accommodating its sprawling and 
roiling internal constituency of those 
who are left behind while being, at the 
same time, sensitive to the demands 
of African solidarity in managing 
the avalanche of fleeing economic 
migrants from badly managed African 
countries. And it must achieve this 
without provoking the kind of backlash 
that it recently experienced. That is not 
all. Its balancing act is in the context of 
a very difficult national process.
Table 1 reveals that more than half 
of those seeking to leave their homes 
to settle in South Africa cite political 
reasons for their decisions. Added to 
the 17% that may be termed economic 
migrants, also related to governance 
issues, it can be proposed that over 
70% of potential migrants from Africa 
do so for political reasons.
The current challenge betrays the 
turbulent undercurrents of South 
Africa’s politics, in particular the 
structure of its economy and their 
impact on national life. The shocking 
hackings to death of foreigners, now 
symbolised by the brutal daylight 
stalking, bludgeoning and stabbing 
to death of Mozambican Emmanuel 
Sithole, are strong reminders of the 
dire consequences of the pervasive 
disillusionment of the black masses in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. They can 
easily turn to criminality as the Sithole 
case demonstrated. The attacks, which 
seem to have been interpreted as a 
product of  xenophobia are indeed 
the other side of the criminal violence 
that seem to have become a quotidian 
reality of this land struggling hard to 
translate its vision of a rainbow nation 
into actuality. Young uneducated 
black South Africans have felt strongly 
disadvantaged in the competition 
in the retail trade and petty services 
that have been taken over by fellow 
Africans from the continent as well as 
from South Asia. The tension had been 
palpable for some time with a few 
well-meaning commentators drawing 
attention to the keg of gun powder in 
South Africa’s national lounge. Indeed 
the margins of South Africa would 
seem to have been given a short shrift 
and this is at the heart of the internal 
debate within the ANC. 
But the situation has arisen not 
because of a lack of trying by the ANC. 
South Africa recognised early that “no 
economy can grow by excluding any 
part of its people, and an economy 
that is not growing cannot integrate 
all of its citizens in a meaningful way” 
– from South Africa's black economic 
empowerment strategy document. 
The need to build an economy that 
is anchored on the full potential of 
all persons and communities across 
the length and breadth of this country 
has been central to the thinking on 
empowering all. Despite the many 
economic gains made in the country 
since 1994, the racial divide between 
rich and poor has persisted. The 
profound danger of such inequalities 
on political stability has been long 
realised. It was highlighted that societies 
characterised by entrenched gender 
inequality or racially or ethnically 
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defined wealth disparities are not likely 
to be socially and politically stable, 
particularly as economic growth can 
exacerbate these inequalities. The 
ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) programme was designed, 
amongst other objectives, to create a 
black middle strata. South Africa's BEE 
policy is not simply a moral initiative 
to redress the wrongs of the past. It is 
a growth and redistribution strategy 
that aims to realise the country's full 
economic potential while helping 
to bring the black majority into the 
economic mainstream.11
The idea was that this new black 
middle strata would create avenues 
for the empowerment to impact on 
the black community as a whole. 
Although some remarkable progress 
has been attained, the expected 
downward cascading impact of BEE 
has been slow. The black majority who 
were denied any education or who 
were outright victims of the Apartheid 
policy of deliberately stifling the 
development of the entrepreneurial 
capacity of blacks are not a match 
for the more experienced Somalis, 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. As 
is often the case with immigrants, the 
foreigners are more motivated to work 
extremely hard and to save through 
self-imposed privations. Often too 
these communities of foreigners are 
not integrated.     
What all this suggests is that 
South Africa must resolve its internal 
contradictions and dilemmas. 
Pretoria has to bite the bullet and 
institute an indigenisation policy 
that must definitively restrict some 
of the activities of foreigners to more 
advanced and relatively capitalised 
ventures and sectors of the economy. 
South Africa has one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world. 
Unemployment is a staggering problem 
especially as the unemployed are 
often also unemployable. Even by 
official estimates, which tend to be 
conservative, the unemployment rate 
in South Africa decreased to 24.3 
percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 
from 25.40 percent in the third quarter 
of 2014. The unemployment rate in 
South Africa averaged 25.25 percent 
from 2000 until 2014, reaching an 
all-time high of 31.20 percent in the 
first quarter of 2003 and a record low of 
21.50 percent in the fourth quarter of 
2008. Another source highlights that by 
2014 the black African unemployment 
rate had declined from 43% to 40%. It 
notes that this is of no comfort to the 
additional 3.1 million black African 
workforce unemployed. Since many 
in this category are unemployable and 
have no history and culture of working, 
it would require some measure of 
affirmative mobilisation to inculcate 
a new working ethic, create self-
employment niches and nurture this 
category of deprived South Africans 
into constructive participants in society 
and economy. 
Therefore, an open door policy 
to all of Africa’s poor and wearied 
cannot be an option. As it currently 
stands, South Africa’s kind of selfless 
solidarity is very unrealistic and can 
only sharpen current antagonisms 
between poor black South Africans 
and other Africans. Solidarity unlimited 
is a politically defeatist route for the 
ANC. South Africa must find creative 
alternatives to pacify its roaring mass 
of disenchanted. It is an imperative to 
defuse the ticking time bomb.
Some sacrifices are therefore 
required. South Africa must limit the 
participation of non-South Africans 
in some of its soft sectors. The retail 
sector, with clearly specified limits that 
are within the capacity of marginalised 
South Africans, should preferably restrict 
the number of foreign owned shops. 
Also, at the next level, Africans who so 
desire should enter into partnerships 
with South Africans in retail and bigger 
wholesale outlets to enhance the stakes 
of South African blacks in these joint 
enterprises. This would be nothing 
innovative as it is the practice in many 
African counties, including Ghana, 
Liberia and Nigeria. South African 
Development Community or no SADC, 
some soft sectors of the economy that 
have the potential to serve as platforms 
for the apprenticeship of the most 
business savvy of the lumpen mass lot 
should rightfully be reserved for South 
African nationals. 
The South African government 
should also provide lending facilities 
that are accompanied or preceded by 
training in the management of small 
businesses with economic outreach 
officers from financial institutions to 
provide advisory services to this new 
cadres of Small and Medium young 
black entrepreneurs. 
Also directly relevant is the need to 
reorient South Africans psychologically 
to begin to see themselves and their 
nation as an integral part and parcel of 
Africa. The entrenched notion of South 
Africa as an autonomous social universe 
vis-à-vis the rest of the Continent 
should be addressed through formal 
and informal engagements with South 
African society. In this connection, 
Africa has the technological 
infrastructure to begin the cultivation 
of transnational people-to-people 
networks in the continent.  
As for the rest of Africa, it is high time 
we learnt that we cannot continue to 
shirk our responsibilities at home and 
expect others to clean up after us. We 
are daily assaulted on our television 
screens by the consequences of the 
pervasive irresponsibility of our states 
and leadership as Africans choose to 
expose themselves to unimaginable 
risks of near certain death just to earn a 
menial living in Europe. It is significant 
that the regional distribution of the 
recipients of permanent resident status 
in South Africa indicates that there 
were more recipients from Africa 
(67%) than those from overseas (33%). 
The leading countries from Africa are 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, 
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The attacks,  
which seem to have 
been interpreted 
as a product of  
xenophobia are indeed 
the other side of the 
criminal violence that 
seem to have become 
a quotidian reality of 
this land struggling 
hard to translate its 
vision of a rainbow 
nation into  
actuality.
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Swaziland, the DRC, Nigeria, Lesotho, 
Cameroon, Congo, Zambia, Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Somalia. Recipients from 
these countries received 85.2% of the 
Permanent Residence Permits issued. 
Even if only anecdotally, one could 
talk of a strong correlation between the 
nature of domestic political governance 
of the origins of the African recipients 
and the fulfilled desire to emigrate. 
More tragically recently over 
6 000 migrants from Africa and nearby 
have been pulled out of certain death 
in the ocean by the Italian navy. 
The other side is over 1 000 illegal 
immigrants into Europe just perished 
in the Mediterranean Sea on the 
way to Lampadusa on the Central 
Mediterranean route from Libya. The 
reasons can be adduced from Table 1. 
Seventy per cent of all those travelling 
to South Africa gave reasons that reflect 
poor governance at home as they 
chose to vote with their feet to South 
Africa. Even excluding the so called 
xenophobic attacks, Africans are dying 
in horrific circumstances just to escape 
the fate at home. African governments 
must empathise with the situation in 
South Africa and work to ensure that 
the solidarity of official South Africa 
is not abused any further. The global 
immigration crisis partly reflects the 
consequences of so much official 
irresponsibility in our national lives. The 
events unfolding in Burundi today are 
indicative of the generation of a new 
wave of African defectors on the way to 
near certain death abroad, far or near.
Yet, while the appalling normative 
regimes of governance in the African 
state significantly motivate the desire of 
many Africans to emigrate, the spike of 
poor African potential migrants actually 
taking the risk, a major feature of the 
current international immigration crisis, 
cannot be divorced from the unilateral 
interventions designed to advance 
strategic objectives of elite extra-
African forces in Africa. The timing 
of the current wave of immigrants, 
especially from Africa, resulting in 
the international immigration crisis, is 
clearly linked to the implosion of the 
Libyan state following the intervention 
of extra-African forces, mainly France 
and Great Britain, co-opting NATO, 
to push for a military ouster of Libya 
leader Muammar Gaddafi. Now, 
Europe, notably France, is nervous 
about receiving immigrants from the 
current crisis, with the anti-immigration 
National Front doing so well in the 
polls, and countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe, which house very few 
asylum seekers, do not want to start 
opening their doors now. 
Belatedly, in early May, 2015, 
European Council President Donald 
Tusk affirmed that Europe will step up 
efforts to address conflict and instability 
as key push factors of migration. 
Mr. Tusk added that the EU would 
co-ordinate the resettlement of more 
people to Europe on a voluntary basis 
and, in classic double speak, “with 
an option for emergency relocation”. 
Meanwhile, in the unfolding tragedy, 
by 21 April the UN refugee agency 
UNHCR reported that so far in 2015 
a total of 36,390 migrants had reached 
Italy, Greece and Malta by sea. It put 
the number of dead at 1,750 and 
missing at 1,776 – including those 
in the shipwreck on 19 April which 
claimed an estimated 800 lives.
Europe has thus remained consistent 
in adopting pragmatic and convenient 
policies toward Africa. The interest 
of the West in the Libyan conflict, as 
with other conflicts in the Third World, 
was not motivated by the love of 
Libya or Africans. Their engagements 
ultimately are only to advance their 
strategic goals, notwithstanding the 
potential destructive consequences for 
the states and societies at the receiving 
end of this poisonous tough love. In 
the case of Libya, Europe, pursuing a 
single minded policy of regime change 
no matter what the aftermath of this 
intervention, brushed aside the far-
sighted advice of key African states 
and statespersons to work toward a 
negotiated resolution of the crisis. A 
negotiated resolution of the Libyan 
conflict, as consistently advocated 
by major and insightful African 
stakeholders, would have reduced the 
prospects in the post Gaddafi era of the 
various nightmares that now confront 
Africa in the devastating destabilisation 
of the Sahel and the instability in Libya 
and its Mediterranean coast. The rise of 
Islamic militancy in the Sahel is another 
direct outcome of the disastrous 
western interventions in Libya.  
Vivienne Walt12 affirms that the 
disputed details over what happened 
the day Muammar Gaddafi was 
executed still fuels the explosive 
violence in Libya pitting the vengeful 
remnants of Gaddafi’s loyalists against 
the patchwork of militias who overthrew 
Gaddafi. The inability of the numerous 
Libyan warlords facilitated to power 
by the West to coerce or negotiate the 
country back to normal statehood has 
given rise to criminal gangs who have 
appropriated power in the various 
regions of the distressed country. The 
spike in illegal immigration as far as 
Africa is concerned is a direct result 
of the abandonment of the broken 
humpty dumpty Libya to its own 
devises by the European powers that 
were so enthusiastically engaged on 
the side of the rebels. The lesson is the 
need for Africa and the African Union 
to strengthen their capacity to leverage 
the political clout of the continent to 
ensure a hegemonic influence on 
African affairs. In a perverse way, 
Europe in the immigration crisis from 
Africa is reaping a well-deserved self-
induced evidently avoidable problem 
emanating directly from its reckless and 
tactless intervention in Libya against 
the advice of perceptive Africa.      
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